Malicious activities have become a primary security threat after hosts are infected. Attackers typically use HTTP to carry out malicious activities, such as botnets, click fraud and phishing, as they can easily hide among the large amount of benign HTTP traffic. The User-Agent (UA) field in the HTTP header carries information on the application, OS, device, etc., and adversaries fake UA strings as a way to evade detection.
7 instance, the majority of benign non-standard UA strings in our network traces belong to AV and software updates. These UA strings are highly random and a UA string shows up only once since it includes a cryptographic hash of information that AV is sending to the remote server. However AV related UA strings are always associated to a AV company domain name, such as symantec.com.
We use such characteristics to develop a detection engine for non-standard UA strings. Figure 1 illustrates a proof of concept for our system. The input to the CFG engine is the HTTP flows per client IP, and the output is the standard UA strings and the non-standard UA strings.
System Overview
First, the standard UA strings are used to create a profile for each application instance running on a single machine, where this profile includes browsers (types and versions), OS (types and versions), devices (e.g, Mac, iPad, PC, etc.), and applications (e.g., mobile apps). These profiles are used later by the inference engines to find anomalies and suspicious activities. Second, the nonstandard UA strings are fed into the Flow Grouper, where UA strings are grouped based on top two level domain names, e.g., all UA strings with domain names symantec.com are grouped together. Then, Hostname Association uses a set of heuristics to label UA strings that poses similar characteristics (see Section 5) . Some UA strings might still be unknown, and therefore we fall back to other source of information like googling them to process these UA strings. Then, the inference engines are used to search for conflicting or anomalous UA strings (see Section 6) . Finally, the system produces a report of benign and malicious activities.
DESIGNING APPLICATION PROFILES FOR STANDARD UA STRINGS
We describe our approach to parse standard UA strings and extract key information from them, such as browser type and operating system. We begin by describing regex-based UA string parsers, a technique typically used in the industry today, and its limitations. Next, we present our UA string parser, which consists of a series of per-application context free grammars. 
Parsing UA Strings with Regular Expressions
A straightforward solution to this problem is to build a huge list of regexes that represents all possible UA strings in the Internet today. In such a system, an incoming UA string is matched against the list of regexes and the first one that matches is used to extract any key information from the string. BrowserScope [7] is an example of this approach. However, this method has several problems:
An inappropriate regex matching order can cause false positives. Short regexes are typically less strict than long regexes and tend to match more often. cannot be expressed using standard regexes, because they are not regular [22] .
Updating heuristic rules is not flexible. Updating heuristic rules in regular expression based system is an important operation if the system were to be widely deployed in practice. Clearly, such a system need to be updated as new versions of the application are released. However, the core of such a system is a laundry list of regular expressions. It is not flexible to make it updated because the newly added rules can confuse existing regex-based method. For instance, new versions of Opera (Opera 15+) have adopted a different format, where the old formats always contain the keyword "Opera" (either at the beginning or the end), but the new ones end with "OPR/[version]" [15] .
To alleviate all these limitations above, we build per-application context-free grammar parsers for UA strings, which we describe in next subsection.
Parsing UA Strings with BNF-based Context Free Grammars
To parse UA strings, we first identify the UA strings generated by popular applications such as commonly used web browsers and iOS-based apps which have a well-defined syntax. We noticed that the syntaxes for the UA strings of these applications can be best specified using contextfree grammars (CFG) in terms of Backus-Naur Form (BNF). Using existing compiler tools, we developed a baseline BNF-based UA string parser to recognize those that are generated by these Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.0) Opera 12.14 standard applications and extract the type of application, OS version and device information. In the following, we present our approach using popular web browsers as primary examples and discuss the advantages of our BNF-based compiler approach.
Web browsers are perhaps the most popular application used on desktop and laptop machines. It is no surprise that they comprise the majority of UA strings we see in our dataset. Table I shows some examples of UA strings for common browsers found in our dataset. We see that the UA strings generated by these browsers contain similar keywords and share certain structural components.
For example, the UA strings generated by IE browsers starts with the keywords "Mozilla (if present). However, the UA strings generated by Firefox, Chrome and Safari also begin with the same keywords (most commonly with "Mozilla/5.0"), followed by a set of OS-related keywords enclosed by "(...)", and ended with a set of specific keywords starting with the rendering and layout engines "Gecko" or "Applekit" and containing the browser type (e.g., Firefox, Chrome or Safari).
On the other hand, the UA strings for Opera browsers begin with "Opera/[version]" (except for newer versions that also begin with "Mozilla/5.0").
In the examples above, all standard browser UA strings manifest ( We define a set of CFG production rules using the BNF forms with non-terminal terms and terminal terms (tokens). Some examples are shown in Table II , where the terms in angular brackets <. . . > indicate non-terminal terms, and all other terms that never appear in the left of the production rules (e.g., various symbols and strings inside quotation marks) are terminal terms (i.e., "tokens"). Table II . Example production rules for browser UA strings.
<standard-browser>::=<browser-prefix>"("<OS-system>")"<browser-suffix>; <browser-prefix>::="Mozilla/4.0"|"Mozilla/5.0"|"Opera/"<ver-1-dot>; <browser-suffix>::=""|<host-info> <render-engine> <opera-version>| <render-engine> <browser-type>|<browser-type>|...; <host-info>::="(<OS-version> <security-level> <language>)"| "(<OS-version> <security-level>)"| "(<OS-version> <language>)"| "(<OS-version>)"|...; <render-engine>::="Presto/"<ver-two-dot>| "Gecko/"<ver-no-dot>| "AppleWebKit/"<ver-1-dot>|...; <security-level>::="U"|"I"|...; <language>::="en"|"es-ES"|"zh-cn"|"zh-tw"|"pl"|"cs"|...; <OS-system>::="compatible;"<IE><window><IE-suffix>|<window>|<OSX>|...; <window>::="Window NT "<version>|<additional-window-info>; <additional-window-info>::="<.net>"|"<plugin>"|... <.net>::=<.net>|".NET"<ver-1-dot>"C"|".NET"<ver-1-dot>"E"|".NET CLR "<ver-2-dot>; <plugin>::="Media Center PC "<ver-1-dot>|...; <IE>::="MSIE "<ver-1-more-dot>|...; <browser-type>::="Firefox/"<ver-1-more-dot>|"Opera/"<ver-1-dot>|<chrome>|...; <chrome-safari>::=<chrome-browser>" "<safari-type>|<safari-suffix>|...; <chrome-browser>::="Chrome/"<ver-1-more-dot>" "<safari>|...; <safari>::="Safari/"<ver-1-more-dot>|<mobile>"Safari/"<ver-1-more-dot>|...; <mobile>::="Mobile"|"Mobile/"<alphanumeric-version-no-dot>"|...; <opera-version>::="Version/"<ver-1-dot>; <version>::=<ver-no-dot>|<ver-1-more-dot>; <ver-1-more-dot>::=<ver-1-dot>|<ver-2-dot>|...; <ver-no-dot>::=<digits>; <ver-1-dot>::=<digits>"."<digits>; <ver-2-dot>::=<digits>"."<ver-1-dot>; <digits>::=<digit><digits>: <digit>::="0"|"1"|...|"9"; BNF production rules to recognize the structure of a UA string that follows the rules and outputs the browser type and other relevant information thus extracted, or otherwise rejects it together with error messages indicating where the syntactic errors occur.
The advantages of context-free BNF-based parser approach for classifying (well-defined) UA strings are the following: (i) it makes the parser scalable and extensible; when new types or versions of browsers are created, we can simply add new production rules or version numbers in the existing rules; (ii) in contrast to a UA parser relying purely on complex regular expression-based heuristics can be verified at the last step by invoking appropriate browser verification modules based on the browser type, OS and other relevant information extracted from the UA string that has passed the syntax analyzer. In Section 6 we discuss how we exploit these last two features (iii) and (iv) to help detect and identify "fake" browser UA strings generated by malicious applications.
The UA strings generated by standard iOS (and MacOS) applications also follow a well-defined syntax: <app-name>/<version> CFNetwork/<version> Darwin/<version>. We have defined production rules and developed a parser for parsing the UA strings generated by the standard iOS/MacOS apps. For the UA strings that pass the grammar checking, the distinction between iOS and MacOS is determined by the CFNetwork version number. Other "well-known" applications such as Window Media Center, Media Player, Window Live, standard browser plug-ins, and standard Android apps also follow well-defined syntaxes, and we have developed BNF-based parsers for them.
Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our CFG-based parser, we compare it with a regexbased UA string parser [7] , the current state-of-the-art. UA strings are randomly chosen from our dataset and parsed by both approaches. Then, the running time of each approach is recorded, as shown in Table III . For parsing the same amount of UA strings, CFG-based parser are much more efficient than regex-based parser. This is because [7] requires a linear scan over many regexes, which degrades performance (see Section 4.1 for a detailed explanation). Table III In our dataset we found more than 40 million HTTP flows and 94, 876 unique UA strings. Applying our BNF-based UA string parsers for standard applications, we separated these unique UA strings matched non-browser parsers for iOS/MacOS, Android and other applications with well-defined syntaxes.
HANDLING NON-STANDARD UA STRINGS
In Section 4, BNF grammar rules assign labels to user-agents based on their lexical structure.
However, not all UA strings follow the BNF grammar rules. Table V shows examples of this type of UA strings. For instance, AV signature updates and OS updates lack structure and contain random strings. To assign labels to user-agents in this category, we developed a heuristic that we call hostname-based association.
We analyzed our dataset and noticed that many of the non-standard UA strings belong to specific applications, such as AV software. AV software embeds local information (e.g. software version, signatures database version, etc) in the UA string when checking for signature updates. Those UA strings differ from browser UA strings in two aspects: (i) each UA string is unique as it includes a as they do not include any hash of the data. Our heuristic, which we describe below, tries to cover both the AV and the OS update cases.
The key intuitions/ideas behind hostname association method is based on our analysis of the UA strings in our dataset. We find that although there are a significant portion of "non-standard"
UA strings, they roughly fall into two categories: 1) UA strings containing mostly fairly random alphanumeric characters; and 2) UA strings containing certain fixed keywords and some loose defined structures. However, a key observation we have made is that the HOSTNAME field in the HTTP flows containing these UA strings provide important hints regarding what type of applications may have generated these UA strings. For instance, for the UA strings in category 1) above, there is often a many-to-one mapping between the UA strings and the (top-2 level) domain name, and the domain name is, say, mcafee.com or kaspersky.com, suggesting that these UA strings -despite they are almost completely random-looking are generated by antivrus sotfware. Similarly, for many UA strings in Category 2 are also a many-to-one mapping or a m-to-n mapping (where m is much larger than n, and n is a smaller number, say, n=2, 3). Even when in some cases where n in the m-ton mapping is relatively larger, there are a few dominant hostnames (e.g., megaupload.com) which reveal what the applications are, or there are certain patterns (e.g., keywords such as "tracker" or "upload") in the hostnames that echo the keywords in the UA strings (e.g., torrent, BTclient). Our UA string-hostname association method basically applies these observations to heuristically label and classify the non-standard applications (which fall into categories such as antivirus, software update, p2p, media player, etc.). Hopefully this helps explain how the hostname association method works.
To determine whether a UA string is "random" or not, we compute the entropy of the string. In our testing, we have varied the entropy value from 2 bits/byte to 6 bits/byte and find that 4 bits/byte yields the best result.
The flow grouper is used in our system to group all flows with the same top-level hostname together so that we can generate the UA strings to hostname mappings. In terms of how much time you retain the string in the "flow grouper", for simplicity, we actually used the entire 24 hours -we The only difference is that when using smaller values, the size of flow groups is smaller. Our system currently runs as an offline UA string classification system. Clearly, when running the system in an "online" manner, a smaller value is likely preferred for fast classification. However, in such a case, one can retain and utilize historical observations of the UA string-hostname associations to make prediction. Investigating this subject is outside the scope of the current paper.
Algorithm Description
The hostname association is a two step process. In the first step, we compute the entropy of the non-standard UA string by using a pseudorandom number sequence test program [16] to identify those that are likely to be a SHA or MD5 hash. If the entropy is more than four bits/byte, we retain this string in the "flow grouper" (see Figure 1 ) for a period of time. In the second step, for those UA strings stored in the flow grouper, we count the number of top-two level domain names (extracted
Evaluation
To evaluate this algorithm, we first build our ground truth. For this, we analyzed our dataset with the CFG-based parsers in order to identify those non-standard UA strings. After this, we manually identified the cases that are AV and then compared them with the results from our algorithm.
We achieved promising results, with precision of 0.9039 and recall of 0.9463. Figure 2 shows the Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) and the number of unknown UA strings after (i) applying the BNF parsing only, and (ii) after using the hostname association as well. The results show that we effectively reduce the number of unknown UA strings using our proposed heuristics. The percentage of clients having more than five unknown UA strings reduced from 80% to 50% after using the hostname association.
Data Analysis
In our dataset, non-standard UA strings (62, 615) pass through the hostname association to filter application-aware cases (58, 522, 61.7%), where the majority are AV (53, 448). More detailed statistics are shown in Table VI . 
MALICIOUS UA DETECTION
In this section, we demonstrate the utility of the UA analysis in identifying anomalies in host activity and in detecting malicious activities. As a proof of concept, we provide three basic inference engines: fake UA string detection, fake OS detection, anomaly detection, for detecting suspicious standard UA strings, and signature based inference engine for detecting suspicious non-standard UA strings.
We note that parsing process described in above sections by itself does not tell us whether a UA string is fake or not, as a UA string which can pass the standard format check can still be fake. This is where the application profiles extracted from the UA strings come into play. Given HTTP flows generated by a single client IP address that is associated with a single device to separate and group flows based on devices, we build application profiles based on the information extracted from the
UA strings, which tell us what OS (and its version) and common applications (and their versions)
are running on the device. These application profiles are used by the inference engines to detect fake (or generally malicious) UA strings. In particular, we look for conflicting information contained in the application profiles. Clearly, detecting fake UA strings (especially when they pass the standard format check) hinges on many contextual and other information contained in the HTTP flows, and so forth. For example, in general given a Window machine, only one version/instance of the IE browser can be running. When we see multiple versions of IE are running, or a version of IE is running on the wrong OS version, this signifies that some of these are fake.
To evaluate these inference engines, we first build our ground truth. We primarily use the commercial IDS to help us separate client machines that are infected with malware vs. those that are not. We use the UA strings extracted from HTTP flows generated by standard applications running on the "clean" machines as samples for context-free grammar specifications. We also check the formats obtained from these samples against those generated from test machines as well as other sources of UA lists. Apart from this, we also use the malware labels generated by the IDS to help us confirm the fake/malicious UA strings we have detected by our system. More specific, we apply inference engines to analyzing clients infected by Backdoor.Tidserv (aka Tidserv). Tidserv is a Trojan horse that displays advertisements, redirects user search results, and opens back doors [4] .
There are 14 clients which have already been labeled as Tidserv by a commercial IDS in our dataset.
We hope that the readers of our paper can see the utility of our methodology from the inference engines we designed. Based on the methodology described above, security analysts can develop their own heuristics according to the concrete problem they are targeting. We begin by presenting suspicious standard UA strings and then continue to show suspicious non-standard UA strings.
Suspicious Standard UA Strings
Fake User-Agent Detection. In inference engine, fake UA detection, we aim to detect fake UA strings which contains conflicting information in UA string itself. As we know, a significant number of UA strings can pass the BNF grammar defined in Section 4 and be classified as standard UA strings. However, not all of them are valid as mentioned above. From the left and middle parts of Figure 3 , we can see that the number of UA strings and Browser type UA strings in the 14 Tidserv clients are more than those in 100 randomly selected clean clients. This indicates the possibility of fraudulent UA strings generated by Tidserv clients. Given the UA string in Table VII, we suppose it to be generated by a Firefox browser version 2.0. According to the Firefox official site, however, we find that Firefox 2.0 is supported by Windows 98 and other recent OS versions, but not by Windows 95. Nevertheless, the UA string is correctly parsed by our CFG.
Moreover, consider the case of "browser-prefix" and "rendering-engine" rules defined in Table II. can enforce them after the BNF parsing. Administrators can also specify their own dependencies in the type checking system. We ran p0f through Tidserv clients and identified many inconsistent HTTP flows, where the OS and found that no other flows were associated with Windows 2000. In addition, by doing a HTTP referer analysis on this flow, we found that the referred hostname associated with this UA string was never accessed by the monitored client, which indicates a potential click-fraud event. Surprisingly, we found that all 6 clients infected with both Tidserv and Trojan.Zeroaccess [5] , generate all the UA strings with OS conflicts. We found a total of 8 distinct fake OSes. We hypothesize that Zeroaccess has a simple codebase that randomly picks a UA from standard UA strings pool without checking the OS of the device that is running the malware.
Anomaly Detection. In inference engine, anomaly detection, we aim to detect fake UA strings from statistic analysis. It is possible for fraudulent UA strings to pass the CFG-based parser, the fake UA detection and the fake OS detection. In this case, we rely on further statistical analysis to identify suspicious hosts. Those fraudulent UA strings can also be found in the Tidserv infected clients.
From the statistics of the 14 Tidserv clients in our dataset, the number of standard browsers in those clients is larger than that in clean clients as shown in Figure 3 . This indicates a suspicious behavior, as in normal cases, we expect very few browsers being used in a single household. [23] show that some of them are often associated with the malicious activities. Thus, we design signature based inference engine to detect suspicious UA strings in non-standard UA strings. After hostname association, if non-standard UA strings cannot be associated with well-known applications, they are classified into "Unknown UA Strings". For UA strings in this category, our system depends on the signature collected from domain knowledge and other sources of information, to judge whether they are normal or not. In our system, we set basic signatures collected from various online sources like [17] .
As shown in Table VII , these UA strings are filterd by signature based inference engine in Tidserv clients. Since and HTTP server would not be able to perform any improvements on user experience based that UA string, "User-Agent: NULL" is abnormal. For the HTTP flows associated with this UA string, VirusTotal [3] reported that the associated hostname is a malicious software download site. Another example in Tidserv clients was the UA string "Trojan Brontok A11", which infects
Windows machines. Note that the bot name is written in the UA string, which could be used as a signal for the C&C server to identify flows from infected clients. The third example in Tidserv clients was a mis-spelling in the UA string. The UA contains "MSlE" (note the lower case "L")
instead of "MSIE" (the upper case "I"). After searching for this UA string, we found it associated with malware Troj/Agent-VUD.
We can envisage that our system can be augmented with rich signatures in the UA strings that do not pass our CFG-based and hostname association UA string classifiers, such as XSS, SQL injection attacks that are embedded in the UA strings. Such a system may prevent a client machine to launch XSS, SQL injections to a targeted server. If running on the server side, our system can simply only allows HTTP requests with legitimate standard web browsers or mobile apps to be forwarded to the server under protection, thereby filtering out ill-formed UA strings (which contain, e.g., malicious
SQL commands for compromising a vulnerable server).
CONCLUSION
Most cyber attacks today are performed over HTTP and the UA string carries a lot of critical information that can be leveraged to detect them. We presented a system that identifies fraudulent UA strings by categorizing the strings based on their syntactic format and running a set of inference engines. We classified the standard UA strings with a novel grammar-guided approach, which leverages context-free grammar to parse and extract application name, device and operating system information. In addition, we developed a heuristic to classify non-standard UA strings by associating them with the hostname field of the corresponding HTTP flow. We devised three inference engines to identify fraudulent UA strings: fake UA string detection, fake OS detection and anomaly detection using statistical features. Finally, we provided several case studies to demonstrate how our approach can lead us to identify malicious applications.
We recognize that our proposed UA string classification methodology is only meant to be one useful tool of a larger arsenal of tools that a security analyst can leverage for detecting malicious activities and attacks. This is because by only considering the UA string of HTTP flows for anomaly detection, we may miss HTTP attacks where the UA string is not the key indicator. In addition, for the case of non-standard UA strings, we currently provide a very basic level of inference, which is not enough to differentiate benign from malicious cases and requires human analysis. Nevertheless, in this paper, we have described and showed the potential of a methodology capable of highlighting
